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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellant/plaintiff appeals from the Third Judicial District
Court's entry of summary judgment in favor of
appellees/defendants Bunzl Utah, Inc. and Carl A. Kruse.
Jurisdiction is proper in this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
78-2-2(3) (1953, as amended).
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

If an employee checklist (which new employees sign) and

an employee handbook clearly and unambiguously state that
employment is "at-will," does a vague, non-specific, preemployment oral statement that employees will be "given a chance
to correct work deficiencies" before termination create an
implied-in-fact agreement that an employee's status will be other
than at-will?
2.

Do limited instances of written or oral warnings to

other employees modify the at-will relationship expressed in the
company's written policies creating an implied-in-fact agreement
that an employee must receive warnings and be given a chance to
correct deficiencies before being terminated?
3.

Is evidence of either an oral statement or an

employer's course of conduct sufficient to create a question of
fact as to whether an implied-in-fact agreement exists when both
an employee checklist and an employee handbook expressly state
that employment is at-will?
4.

Even if the employer in this case did have an implied-

in-fact agreement not to dismiss an employee without giving the

employee an opportunity to correct her deficiencies, did the
employer fulfill that obligation under the undisputed facts of
this case?
5.

Does this case justify a ruling that is directly

contrary to recent precedent and established Utah case law
regarding:
(a)

Utah's refusal to recognize a cause of action for

breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
an at-will employment relationship;
(b)

Utah's requirements that a defamation claim include

allegations and proof of special damages or statements that are
slanderous per se, and publication to third-parties; and
(c)

Utah's refusal to recognize a common law claim for

retaliatory discharge?
The issues in this case were summarily decided in
defendants' favor•

Summary judgment is appropriate when the

facts as established in the pleadings and affidavits, viewed in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, present "no
genuine issue[s] as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
P. 56(c).

This determination is a question of law.

Utah R. Civ.
Under the

appropriate standard of review, this court should'afford the
trial court's conclusions of law no deference, and should review
them de novo "for correctness."

Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort,
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155 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1991); see also Blue Cross & Blue
Shield v. State of Utah, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989).
VI. DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Defendants submit that Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 771
P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) and Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc., 161 Utah
Adv. Rep 7 (Utah 1991) are controlling in this case and affirm
that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and-Course of Proceedings Below
This appeal is taken from the Third Judicial District

Court's order of summary judgment for defendants on December 19,
1990.

Plaintiff commenced this action against defendants in

December 1988, alleging six causes of action for wrongful
termination and defamation.

R. 2-9.

The wrongful termination

claims were based on purported breaches of both an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and an implied-in-fact
agreement altering the company's at-will employment policy.
Defendants moved for summary judgment.

After oral arguments, the

Third District Court granted and entered judgment on December 19,
1990, based upon defendants' memoranda.

R. 482-483.

filed a Notice of Appeal on January 17, 1991.
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R. 484.

Plaintiff

B.

Statement of Facts
Defendant, Bunzl Utah, Inc. ("Bunzl") hired plaintiff as a

bookkeeper on January 27, 1986.

R. 2.

Prior to her employment,

she was interviewed by Terry Frank of Bunzl.

R. 300-301. During

the interview, Mr. Frank explained to her that Bunzl was "an atwill company and that [plaintiff had] the right to leave at any
time, and . . . [Bunzl had] the right to dismiss [plaintiff] at
any time."

R. 303-304.

Plaintiff then inquired, "Surely you

would not dismiss an employee without giving them a chance to
correct deficiencies for job performance?"
that Mr. Frank responded, "Oh, no.
like that.

Plaintiff alleges

We would never do anything

We have procedures that we follow for disciplinary

action. . . ."

R. 304.1

On her first day of employment with Bunzl, approximately
January 31, 1986, plaintiff signed a New Employee Checklist.
Immediately above her signature, the Checklist stated:
I understand the above are general management
guidelines and may be changed as business necessity
requires. The above does not constitute a written
contract and I understand mv employment is for no
definite period and may be terminated at will.
I acknowledge that we have discussed all the above.
R. 364 (emphasis added).

1

Respondents deny that Mr. Frank made any such statement.
For purposes of this appeal, however, respondents.assume that Mr.
Frank made this statement, in order to present the facts in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
-4-

Plaintiff admits that she was hired for an indefinite
period.

R. 366,

She also admits that she understood she would

be an "at-will" employee and that she never had a written
employment contract with Bunzl.

R. 302, 308, 366.

Plaintiff

understood that she could leave Bunzl at any time for any or no
reason.

R. 309.

At the time of her hire, plaintiff understood that Bunzl was
preparing an Employee Handbook which would outline the company's
disciplinary and termination procedures.

R. 306-307.

In April

1987, plaintiff received a copy of the Handbook and read it.
R. 309.

The front page of the Employee Handbook provides as

follows:
The plans, policies, rules and procedures described in
this Handbook are not conditions of employment. Bunzl
reserves the right to modify, revoke, suspend,
terminate, or change any or all such plans, policies,
rules or procedures, in whole or in part, at any time
with or without prior notice. The plans, policies,
rules and procedures described in this Handbook
supersede the terms and conditions of any previous
plans, policies, rules and procedures.
This Handbook is not intended to create, nor shall it
be construed to create, a contract between Bunzl and
any employee, nor shall any of the provisions of the
plans, policies, rules or procedures described in this
Handbook create an employment of any fixed or
indefinite duration.
Any action of any Bunzl officer, manager, supervisor or
representative in applying the terms of this Handbook,
which may leave the appearance of establishing an
employment contract of fixed or indefinite duration, is
expressly without authorization and may not be relied
upon by any Bunzl employee.
See R. 370 (emphasis added).
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The Handbook also expressly provides that employment with
Bunzl is at-will:
Except for employees who are parties to express written
Bunzl employment contracts or agreements providing to
the contrary, employment with Bunzl is employment at
will and as such, the employee may terminate his/her
employment at any time and for any reason, Bunzl may
terminate the employment of a Bunzl employee under the
same terms. Nevertheless, in order to allow for the
orderly change of assignments, the Company expects an
employee to provide to Bunzl notice of separation at
least fourteen (14) calendar days prior to the date of
separation. In turn, except in cases of misconduct
warranting immediate termination, Bunzl, before
effecting separation of a full time employee with more
than twelve (12) months service, will provide in its
discretion either notice of separation fourteen (14)
calendar days prior to the date of separation or
provide, without notice, separation pay equivalent to
not less than the regular straight time base pay the
employee would have otherwise earned during such
fourteen (14) calendar day period.
See R. 372 (emphasis added).
Finally, the Handbook indicates that no plan of progressive
discipline or any disciplinary procedures other than at-will are
in place:
The Rules that follow are not set down in a sequence of
gravity or importance. No employee may rely that a
program of progressive discipline is in effect, but
rather that each employee must recognize that unless
he/she has an express written Bunzl employment contract
or agreement to the contrary, employment at Bunzl is
at-will employment and just as employees may without
cause separate from Bunzl upon appropriate fourteen
calendar day notice, so, also, Bunzl may separate
employees without cause with appropriate fourteen
calendar day notice (except that fourteen calendar day
Bunzl notice may be dispensed with for conduct
warranting immediate termination). As a conseguence,
separation may be effected with or without cause as
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well as for any single Rule violation, without regard for
any other consideration.
See R. 384 (emphasis added).
As part of her responsibilities, plaintiff was required to
prepare month-end closing reports for the Salt Lake City office.
She would then send these reports to Bunzl's regional controller,
Debra Scott, in the home office in St. Louis, Missouri.

The

deadline for these reports was approximately five days after the
end of each month.

R. 310-312, 361-362.

By November of 1987,

plaintiff was routinely requesting extensions of this deadline.
Plaintiff was late in submitting her closing reports in January,
February, March, and April of 1988.

R. 313-314.

Debra Scott visited the Salt Lake Office in November 1987
and reviewed the officefs accounting procedures and plaintifffs
bookkeeping procedures.

She spent time with plaintiff, assisting

her in overcoming her delays in submitting the closings and
streamlining office procedures.

R. 313, 317-318, 362.

The tardiness of the month-end reports created problems for
Debra Scott in Bunzl's corporate office, and plaintiff was aware
of that.

In fact, when plaintiff was working on the January 1988

closing, Ms. Scott told her, "I have to have your closing.

I

have to correlate my figures and give them to corporate by the
15th of the month.

I have to have those closings."

R. 314-315.

Plaintiff became very concerned about the lateness of the
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reports, and indicated that she nfelt very bad" about the
problem.

R. 316.

Debra Scott again visited the Salt Lake City office in
February or March of 1988. Upon her arrival, Ms. Scott asked
plaintiff when the closing would be finished.

Plaintiff said it

would take "at least two days." Ms. Scott responded, "Well, then
I'll help you, because we don't have two days."

Ms. Scott then

did some of the postings to help close the books.

Plaintiff

realized at that time that her lateness was a major concern to
Ms. Scott and the company.

R. 321-324.

Another Bunzl corporate employee, Trina Travis, visited the
Salt Lake City office in April 1988 and assisted plaintiff in
finalizing the closing reports for March.

R. 323-324.

Bunzl

also hired temporary employees in February and March of 1988 to
assist plaintiff in filing the reports.

R. 324-326, 341-345,

346-358.
Plaintiff was late in finalizing the April 1988 closing
report.

In fact, she was still working on it on May 20, 1988

when Debra Scott returned to the Salt Lake City office.
322, 329-330.

R. 321-

Plaintiff was terminated on that day, at which

time defendant Carl Kruse, the Salt Lake City office manager,
gave her a termination letter and explained that her termination
was principally due to her consistent lateness in submitting the
closings.

R. 327-328. At the time of her termination, plaintiff
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received two weeks' severance pay pursuant to the terms of the
Employee Handbook.

R. 340.

With respect to her defamation claim, plaintiff admits that
the only allegedly defamatory statement of which she complains is
her termination letter, in which defendant Carl Kiruse stated that
her job performance was "unacceptable."

R. 338, 388.

Plaintiff

has no personal knowledge or direct evidence that anyone at Bunzl
made any defamatory statements about her to other Bunzl
employees.

Plaintiff, herself, heard no defamatory statements

and is aware of none.

R. 335-339. (,fQ. [A]re you aware of any

specific defamatory statement that was made?

A. No.")

Similarly, plaintiff has no personal knowledge and is unaware of
any defamatory statements about her made by Carl Kruse or anyone
else at Bunzl to any person outside of Bunzl.

R. 339. ("Q. Do

you have personal knowledge that statements were made to any
people outside of Bunzl?

A. No.

I just can't remember ever

having heard of anything said to anyone outside of Bunzl.")
Plaintiff cites four instances of warnings or probationary
time periods issued to other Bunzl employees.

Glen Rigby

received a memorandum outlining certain employment objectives and
giving him sixty days to make improvements in his job
performance.

He was later demoted.

R. 451-452.

Ron Romero was

given written warning of his deficiencies and a 90-day
probationary period.

He was later terminated.

R. 449.

Rodney

Austin was given two oral warnings to stop "playing salesman."
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R. 454,

Kathy Fletcher received a written notice of performance

deficiencies and was told that unless she improved, she would be
terminated.

R. 458.

VIII. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
A.

Summary judgment was appropriate in this case because:
1.

Both the signed Employee Checklist and Bunzl's

subsequent Employee Handbook clearly and unambiguously state that
employment was at-will. Therefore:
a.

Bunzl had the right to terminate plaintiff's

employment at any time, with or without cause;
b.

The vague, oral statement by Mr. Frank did not

create an implied-in-fact agreement altering plaintiff's at-will
status;
c. Instances of progressive discipline did not abrogate
the at-will policy nor create an implied-in-fact agreement; and
d. Evidence of either the inconsistent oral statement
or Bunzl's course of conduct in the face of clear written
promulgations is insufficient to preclude summary judgment.
2.

Even if an implied-in-fact agreement was created that

plaintiff would receive an opportunity to correct her
deficiencies before termination, plaintiff had that opportunity.
Plaintiff was aware of the problem and given seven months to
correct it before her termination.
B.

Plaintiff's remaining claims fail because:
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1.

Pursuant to several cases, including this court's

recent decision in Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc., 161 Utah Adv. Rep,
7 (Utah 1991), Utah does not recognize an implied-in-law covenant
of good faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will rule.
2.

Plaintiff does not and cannot state a claim for

defamation; and
3.

Utah does not recognize a common law claim for

retaliatory discharge.
IX. ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE
THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANTS.
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issues of
material fact exist, and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

no such issues of fact exist.

In the instant case,

Neither the alleged oral statement

by Terry Frank nor Bunzl's course of conduct with other employees
created an implied-in-fact agreement that plaintiff's employment
status would be anything but strictly at-will.

Since Bunzl's at-

will policy was not merely a presumption, but rather was
expressly outlined in both the Employee Checklist and the
Employee Handbook, any evidence of an implied-in-fact agreement
that would limit that unfettered right is insufficient to create
a question of fact, and defendants are entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
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A.

The Ambiguous Pre-Emplovment Oral Statement did not
Create an Implied-in-Fact Agreement Modifying
Plaintiff's At-Will Status Because Bunzl's Written
Policies Clearly State that Employment was At-Will.
1.

Under Utah Case Law, Bunzl's written Employee
Checklist and Employee Handbook establish that
plaintiff was an at-will employee.

The Utah Supreme Court, in recent decisions, has held that
if an employee is hired for an indefinite term without a written
employment contract, a presumption is created that employment is
at-will.

Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon, & Davis, Inc., 777 P.2d 483

(Utah 1989).

This presumption may be rebutted by evidence of a

contrary intent based on language in an employment manual or
bulletin.

See Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033,

1044 (Utah 1989); Brehanv v. Nordstrom, Inc., 161 Utah Adv. Rep.
7 (Utah 1991).

However, in the instant case, that presumption is

affirmed, rather than rebutted, by the language in the company's
written policies.

Plaintiff claims that the alleged oral

statement by Terry Frank rebutted the at-will doctrine.

However,

the aforementioned cases indicate that the written policies
control in this case and establish that plaintiff was an at-will
employee.
If the language of the Employee Handbook has the power to
abrogate the at-will doctrine, then under Berube and Nordstrom,
it certainly has the power to reinforce it.

In Nordstrom,

Justice Stewart states that evidence of "pertinent oral
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representations" and "employer's course of conduct" may be
relevant to determine the intent of the parties.

161 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 11. However, such evidence only becomes relevant "[i]f
the terms of the manual do purport to limit [the company's] power
to discharge."

Id.

The obvious corollary to Justice Stewart's statement is if
the Handbook expresses the at-will policy in clear language, then
evidence of inconsistent oral statements or course of conduct is
irrelevant and insufficient to create a question of fact as to
the parties' intent.

In fact, Justice Stewart states "that when

it is plain that a manual or bulletin does not limit the right to
discharge at will, the case need not go to a jury."

Id. at 11

(quoting Caldwell, 777 P.2d at 486). Triable factual issues
therefore only exist if the terms of an employment manual attempt
to limit the right to terminate at-will.

Since the Bunzl

Handbook reaffirms the at-will policy, the evidence of the
alleged contradictory oral statement is irrelevant.

The

company's at-will policy, expressed unambiguously in writing,
obviates the issue, and an inconsistent oral statement can not
create an implied-in-fact agreement to the contrary.
Plaintiff suggests that because the Employee Handbook did
not exist at the time of her hire, its stated at-will policy did
not apply to her.

However, plaintiff was aware of Bunzl's at-

will policy long before the Handbook was issued.

Plaintiff

admits that during her pre-employment interview with Mr. Frank he
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explained to her that her employment was at-will and Bunzl could
terminate her at any time.

R. 303-304.

Moreover, at the time

of her hire, plaintiff also read and signed the Employee
Checklist which clearly states that her employment could be
"terminated at will."

R. 364. Plaintiff's signature on this

document indicates that she, in fact, was conscious from the
beginning of her employment that she could be terminated atwill.
In addition, pursuant to the language in the Handbook
itself, plaintiff was clearly bound by its terms.

Plaintiff

admits that at the time she began working for Bunzl, she knew the
Employee Handbook was forthcoming and that it would outline the
company's procedures on termination and discipline.

R. 306-307.

She admits she received and read the Handbook when it was
published in April, 1987.

R. 309.

The Handbook states that it

"supersedes the terms and conditions of any previous plans,
policies, rules and procedures."

R. 370.

It goes on to state in

two different places that employment is "at-will."

R. 372, 384.

Finally, it expressly states that, "[n]o employee may rely that a
program of progressive discipline is in effect . . . •"

R. 384.

These provisions specifically override any implications which
could be drawn from Mr. Frank's statement, even though the
handbook was published later.

Since the Handbook terms

superseded any previous policies, the Handbook was applicable to
all employees, regardless of their starting dates.
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Additionally, by continuing her employment, plaintiff
impliedly accepted the terms of the Handbook.

In Foley v.

Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal. 3d 654, 765 P.2d 373, 254 Cal.
Rptr. 211 (1988), the California Supreme Court held that an
employment manual can be interpreted as an offer for a unilateral
contract.

An employee can impliedly accept that offer by

continuing to work.

This court said essentially the same in

Berube, stating that continued service after the publication of a
handbook is sufficient consideration to make the additional terms
part of the employment contract.

771 P.2d at 1044-45.

Therefore, by continuing to work, plaintiff accepted the "offer"
formed by the Handbook and impliedly agreed to be bound by it.
2.

Given the existence of the written Employee
Checklist and Employee Handbook, evidence of an
inconsistent oral statement is insufficient to
preclude summary judgment.

The Employee Handbook and Employee Checklist are written,
affirmative expressions of the company's intention to preserve
the at-will relationship.

Other jurisdictions have ruled on this

issue and held that, as a matter of law, written publications of
the company's at-will policy prevail over oral statements that
attempt to limit it.

In Lofvendahl v. Barclays American Corp., 5

IER Cases (B.N.A) 821 (CD. Cal. 1990),2 the plaintiff submitted
evidence that during his interviews, he was given oral assurances

2

A copy of this case is attached hereto as Addendum A.
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that as long as he "carried out his duties, he would have a job."
Id. at 824. He claimed that the oral representations created an
implied-in-fact agreement that he would only be terminated for
cause.

Barclays, however, submitted a copy of its Employee

Handbook, which clearly stated that employment with the company
was at-will and that an employee could be terminated with or
without cause at any time.

The court held that in view of the

Handbook, with its specific at-will provisions, any evidence of
oral statements or implied-in-fact agreements inconsistent with
the Handbook would constitute a mere "scintilla" of evidence too
insignificant to preclude summary judgment.

Id. (citing Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-252 (1986)).

See also

Wing v. Anchor Media Ltd. of Texas, 59 Ohio St.3d 108, 110, 570
N.E.2d 1095, 1098 (1991) (written statements which unequivocally
[set forth] that employment is "terminable at the will of the
employer" bar a finding that the employment relationship is other
than at-will); Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 IER
Cases (B.N.A.) 1453 (S.C., County Ct. C.P. 1989)3 (defendant
company negated any contractual effect of prior oral statements
by notifying plaintiff in writing that employment was at-will).
In a recent decision, the Michigan Court of Appeals, also
held that a company's written statements—not oral
representations—are its controlling policy.

3

Grow v. General

A copy of this case is attached hereto as Addendum B.
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Products, 184 Mich. App. 379, 457 N.W.2d 167 (1990).

There, the

plaintiff claimed that oral statements such as, "you have a good
future here," and "you have expertise," created an implied-infact agreement that his employment could only be terminated for
cause.

However, the company had issued a memorandum that clearly

and unambiguously stated that employment could be terminated with
or without cause, at any time.

The court therefore held that in

light of the clear statement of the at-will policy in the
memorandum, plaintiff's reliance on the oral statements was
unjustifiable as a matter of law.

Id. at 381, 457 N.W.2d at 770.

The Utah Supreme Court has also addressed this issue in
Caldwell v. Ford Bacon & Davis, 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989), in
which the court focused on the written policies of the company,
not the alleged oral representations.

The defendant in Caldwell

had a written employment manual which outlined a detailed
procedure for discharging employees for cause.

The manual stated

that involuntary terminations could be carried out without
notice.

However, the plaintiff testified that he was told in his

hiring interview that an employee could only be terminated for
cause after first receiving three letters or three warnings.
Plaintiff was later terminated without notice.
The Utah Supreme Court followed its Berube decision and held
that a factual question existed as to whether the employment
manual formed a term of employment.

Significantly, the court

declined to even mention the oral representations as having any
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force to rebut the at-will presumption.

The court did hold,

however, that summary judgment was appropriate because the
employer properly followed the provisions of the handbook in
terminating the plaintiff.
Similarly, in this case, during the employment interview,
Mr. Frank allegedly promised plaintiff that employees would not
be terminated without an opportunity to correct deficiencies;
however, neither the Employee Checklist nor the subsequent
Handbook mentioned such a policy.

Instead, they clearly

emphasized that employment with Bunzl was at-will, negating any
prior oral statements to the contrary.

Therefore, the evidence

regarding the alleged oral representation is insufficient to
create a question of fact.

Moreover, Bunzl followed the express

terms of its Employee Handbook in terminating plaintiff's
employment by paying plaintiff two-weeks' severance pay at the
time of her termination.

This is the only procedure, aside from

the at-will policy, provided in the Handbook.

Therefore, based

on Caldwell, because Bunzl properly followed the provisions of
its Handbook in terminating plaintiff, it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
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3.

The alleged oral statement of Mr. Frank was vague,
ambiguous, and insufficient to create an impliedin-fact agreement.

Assuming Mr. Frank made the alleged oral statement,
defendants were still entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Even absent the Checklist or Handbook provisions outlining the
at-will policy, Mr. Frank's oral statement was so vague and
ambiguous that it lacked the force to rebut the presumption of
at-will, and it did not merit plaintiff's reliance that she would
be given a chance to correct deficiencies before termination.

In

Aberman v. Maiden Mills Indus., 414 N.W.2d 769 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that statements such
as, "permanent employment," "life employment," and "we are
offering you security" were too vague to create a contract for
anything other than at-will employment.

The court declared that

"oral, uncorroborated, vague in important details, and highly
improbable statements" are not sufficient to change at-will
employment status.

Id. at 771.

In Sanders v. Amerihealth, 898 F.2d 131 (11th Cir. 1990),
the company president told the plaintiff during a pre-employment
interview that "as long as you do a good job for me, you've got a
good future with this company."

However, the Eleventh Circuit

held that the statement was too general and vague to have the
sufficient contractual effect to abrogate the plaintiff's atwill status.
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The Utah Supreme Court faced a similar claim in Rose v.
Allied Development Co., 719 P.2d 83 (Utah 1986).

There, the

plaintiff contended that he relied on the employer's promise on
two separate occasions that the plaintiff could return to school
and still continue his employment.

When the employer determined

that school was interfering with plaintiff's work
responsibilities, he was discharged.

The Utah Supreme Court

upheld the summary judgment granted in the employer's favor,
noting that the plaintiff was an at-will employee and to prevail
on a wrongful discharge claim requires more than the plaintiff's
"subjective understanding that the brief conversations [with his
employer] became a binding obligation not to terminate him."

Id.

at 87.
Rose presents a much more compelling argument than the
present case.

In Rose, the plaintiff had two conversations with

his supervisor after his hire, as opposed to one vague,
generalized statement made during a pre-hire interview.

The

plaintiff in Rose also had his employer's specific assent to
return to school.

Here the alleged statement by Mr. Frank did

not specifically set out what the company would do to give an
employee an opportunity to correct job deficiencies.
In Aberman and Sanders the oral statements, although deemed
too vague to form a contract, were also more specific than
Mr. Frank's ambiguous comment, which was merely a response to
plaintiff's question whether employees would be given an
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opportunity to correct work deficiencies.

Mr. Frank added, "we

have procedures that we follow for disciplinary action."

R. 304.

However, he did not mention what those specific procedures were.
Nor did he mention any specific details as to how employees would
receive notice or warnings, whether the warnings would be written
or oral, or a specific time period allotted for the corrective
action to take place.

In short, he gave no specific outline of

the company's discipline procedure.

If the oral statements in

JRose, Aberman, and Sanders lacked contractual force, then Mr.
Frank's alleged oral statement, which was also general, vague,
and susceptible to plaintiff's subjective understanding, had no
power to create an implied-in-fact agreement, particularly in the
face of clear written language to the contrary.
B.

If the Employee Checklist and Employee Handbook State
that Employment is At-Will, Limited Instances of
Written or Oral Warnings to Other Employees do not
Alter Plaintiff's At-Will Status.

An employer's practices and conduct do not abrogate its atwill rights.

Even if Bunzl did, in fact, give some employees

warnings or probation, such conduct would not change plaintiff's
at-will status.

In Bruno v. Plateau Mining Co., 747 P.2d 1055

(Utah Ct. App. 1987), the plaintiff, who was terminated for
fighting inside a mine, claimed that Plateau had a de facto
policy of not terminating employees for fighting; he even
submitted affidavits from co-workers who knew of no Plateau

employees who had been terminated for fighting.

The court

stated, however, that even if the company did have such a policy,
that was not "enough to establish Plateau's intentional surrender
of its right to terminate [plaintiff's] employment at will."

747

P.2d at 1058. The court also held as a matter of law that even
if the allegations were true, they were insufficient to create an
implied-in-fact agreement, and summary judgment was therefore
appropriate.

Id.

Bruno is analogous to the present case.

Simply because

Bunzl management issued written or oral warnings to four other
employees, no implied-in-fact agreement was ever created that
plaintiff would be treated in the same manner.

Past actions do

not automatically abrogate an employer's right to terminate at
will.
Again, Lofvendahl v. Barclays American Corp., 5 IER Cases
(B.N.A) 821 (CD. Cal. 1990), is on point.

There, the plaintiff

claimed that in addition to receiving oral assurances of job
security, Barclays had a standard practice of terminating
employees for cause only, and that this course of conduct created
an implied-in-fact agreement that he would be terminated only for
cause.

The court answered this question as it did the issue of

oral representations: in the face of a handbook that clearly
states that employment is at-will, evidence of inconsistent
course of conduct is insufficient to create a question of fact.
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The employer was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

Id. at 824.
Similarly, in the present case, any evidence'of contrary

conduct becomes irrelevant in view of the terms of the handbook.
Even if Bunzl did issue warnings to a few other employees and
give them opportunities to improve, the fact that the handbook
expressly stated that employment was at-will means that the
trier-of-fact could not reasonably find any implied-in-fact
agreement contrary to the at-will policy.

The trial court

therefore correctly granted summary judgment.
Plaintiff may argue that language in Brehanv v. Nordstrom,
Inc., 161 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1991) indicates that evidence of
"employer's course of conduct" is relevant.

Again that evidence

is only relevant n[i]f the terms of the manual do purport to
limit [the company's] power to discharge [at-will]."
Adv. Rep. at 11.

161 Utah

Since the Bunzl Handbook, as well as the

Employee Checklist, affirms the at-will policy, the evidence of
Bunzl*s course of conduct is not relevant.
C.

Even if the Oral Statements and/or Course of Conduct
did Create an Implied-in-Fact Agreement, Plaintiff was
Aware of Her Deficiencies and Given Abundant
Opportunity to Correct Them Prior to Her Termination.

Repeated visits from Bunzlfs corporate personnel were
sufficient notification to plaintiff that her performance was
unsatisfactory, and Bunzl afforded her ample opportunity to
correct those deficiencies.

The undisputed facts establish that
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plaintiff was aware that her tardiness was creating problems for
Bunzl's corporate offices.

R. 314-315.

She admits that she was

routinely seeking extensions of the closing deadline by November
1987, and that her reports for January, February, March and
April, 1988, were all late.

R. 313-314.

She also admits she

knew this was a major problem and concern for Debra Scott,
Bunzl's regional controller.

R. 321-324.

The problem was so severe that Debra Scott made three trips
to Salt Lake City to address this problem; Trina Travis, another
Bunzl employee, also came to Salt Lake City to assist plaintiff
in timely finishing the closings.
330.

R. 313, 317-318, 321-324, 329-

Bunzl also hired temporary employees for two-week periods

in both February and March of 1988, to help plaintiff.

R. 324-

326, 341-345, 346-358.
Debra Scott and the other corporate personnel were not
making routine training or inspection visits.

Rather, they came

with the specific intent to help plaintiff overcome her
deficiencies and "streamline" the office procedures.

R. 313,

317-318, 362.
Those visits, especially in light of comments such as "we
don't have two days" (R. 322), and "I have to have those
closings" (R. 314-315) were sufficient to put plaintiff on notice
that her performance was inadequate and that unless she made
significant improvement, she would be replaced.

Plaintiff, in

fact, admits that she knew her deficiencies were a problem.
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R.

321-324.

Bunzl endured the problem for seven months from

November 1987 to May 20, 1988, giving her abundant opportunity to
make improvement and correct her deficiencies.

See R. 372.

Thus, even if Bunzl had an implied-in-fact agreement not to
dismiss plaintiff without giving her an opportunity to correct
her job deficiencies, Bunzl complied with that obligation based
on the undisputed facts of this case.
Moreover, at the time of termination, Bunzl correctly
followed the only applicable termination procedure set forth in
the Employee Handbook.

Because plaintiff was a full-time

employee with more than twelve months service, Bunzl paid her two
weeks1 severance pay.

See R. 340.
POINT II.

THIS CASE DOES NOT WARRANT AN OVERRULING OF RECENT,
ESTABLISHED UTAH CASE LAW.
Plaintiff states without any substantial support or analysis
that the present case justifies "a modification of the language
and decisions in Utah cases" concerning employment relations.
(Appellant's Brief at p.6).

However, defendants assert that the

logic and language of recent Utah Supreme Court decisions are
directly applicable to the present case and affirm that summary
judgment was appropriate.
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A.

The Utah Supreme Court has Declared that No Implied
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Exists in an
At-Will Employment Relationship.

In Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd,, 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989),
this court, by a three to two vote, declined to recognize an
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exception to the
at-will rule.

Subsequently, in Loose v. Nature-All Corp., 785

P.2d 1096, 1097 (Utah 1989), this court refused to recognize a
cause of action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing that would limit an employer's right to
terminate an at-will employee.

Finally, in Nordstrom, supra,

this court unanimously declared that absent any express terms
limiting the employer's right to terminate at-will, there is no
cause of action for alleged breach of an implied-in-law covenant
of good faith and fair dealing.

161 Utah Adv. Rep. at 10-11.

Therefore, no such covenant exists in the present case, and
summary judgment was appropriate on this issue.
B.

Plaintiff's Defamation Claim is Barred Because the
Undisputed Facts Establish that the Alleged Defamatory
Statement is Not Slander Per Se, Plaintiff has Suffered
No Special Damages, and there was No Publication of the
Alleged Defamatory Statement to Third Parties.

Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for defamation, claiming
that "her discharge for unacceptable performance constitutes a
defamation of her in her business and professional capacities."
R. 8.
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An action for defamation will not lie unless the plaintiff
has suffered special damages or, alternatively, the statements
complained of amount to slander per se. Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d
318, 320-21 (Utah 1979).

Special damages are those "particular

items of damages which result from circumstances peculiar to the
case at hand," and should be specially pled.

Prince v. Peterson,

538 P.2d 1325, 1328 (Utah 1975).
In this case, plaintiff does not allege statements that
amount to slander per se.

The only alleged defamatory statement

of which plaintiff complains is her termination letter, in which
Carl Kruse stated that her performance was "unacceptable.ff
338, 388.

R.

Words that merely impute poor business practices are

insufficient to support a claim of slander per se.

Baum v.

Gillman, 667 P.2d 41, 43 (Utah 1983) (statements concerning
plaintiff's inabilities regarding his profession, that he was
deeply in debt, involved in business related litigation, failed
to make promised payments and used other's money to pay his
creditors were not slanderous per se).

Accordingly, a discharge

for "unacceptable performance" is not per se slanderous as a
matter of law.
Given the fact that the alleged defamatory statement is not
slanderous per se, plaintiff must plead and prove that she has
suffered special damages.

However, nowhere in her Complaint does

she make such an allegation and, as a result, her defamation
claim is defective.
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Plaintiff also fails to allege, and there is no proof of,
the requisite publication of a defamatory statement to a thirdparty.

Judge Winder stated the following in Boisiolv v. Morton

Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 800 (D. Utah 1988), in analyzing
the pleading requirements of a defamation claim under Utah law,
Utah law requires that a claim must identify the
defamatory statement either by its words or words to
that effect; general conclusory statements are
inadequate . . . the complaint [must] allege when,
where and to whom the alleged defamatory statement was
made.
Id. at 800 (emphasis added).

Plaintiff admits that she has no

personal knowledge of, and is unaware of, any defamatory
statements being made by anyone at Bunzl to any other person
either inside or outside the Bunzl organization.

R. 335-339.

Thus, plaintiff does not allege, nor can she prove, to whom any
alleged defamatory statements were made and, as a result, utterly
fails to satisfy the requisite publication element.
C.

Utah does Not Recognize a Common Law Claim for
Retaliatory Discharge.

Plaintiff also alleges that her manager terminated her in
retaliation for her disclosures of local office problems to
corporate headquarters.

See R. 6-7.

This claim appears to be

merely another attempt to allege a wrongful discharge action.
Significantly, Utah has no common law claim for retaliation.
Since plaintiff fails to cite any authority for this proposition,
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and defendants are aware of none, these allegations fail to state
a cause of action.
Utah statute does recognize a retaliation claim under the
Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, Utah Code Ann. S 34-35-1, et sea.
(1953, as amended), which addresses illegal discrimination based
on sex, race, age, religion, handicap, or national origin.
However, such a cause is obviously not applicable to the facts of
this case and, even if it were, plaintiff has failed to follow
the procedures to assert a retaliation claim under the Act, and
the time period for filing such a claim has long expired.
X. CONCLUSION
Appellees respectfully request that this court find in its
favor and affirm the Third District Court's grant of summary
judgment.
DATED this 21st day of June, 1991.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Max D. tfh^eler
StanleyLtf. Preston
Attorneys for Defendants

-29-

XI. ADDENDA
Addendum A:

Lofvendahl v. Barclays American Corp., 5 IER Cases
(B.N.A) 821 (CD. Cal. 1990)

Addendum B:

Allan v. Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 4 IER
Cases (B.N.A.) 1453 (S.C., County Ct. C.P. 1989)

Addendum A

LOFVENDAHL v. BARCLAYS AMERICAN CORP.
lantic Nat'l Bank'Merchants, No.
88-4141, Slip Op. at 14, 1990 W.L. 4622,
p. 6 (D.N.J. 1990). Where the termination decision is accompanied by a
showing of harassment on the part of
the employer, however, courts have allowed claims for intentional infliction
of emotional distress to go to the jury.
Borecki, 694 F.Supp. at 61.
[2] Although plaintiff claims harassment from March to May 1988 in his
bnef and complaint, no submission
was made in conjunction with this motion which would support the harassment charge. Based upon the record
before it, it appears to the court that
defendants' conduct was not sufficiently severe to be considered so outrageous and extreme that it exceeds all
bounds of societal decency.
Expert testimony is required to support a claim for an injury which is
either subjective in nature or of the
sort that its cause and degree of severity cannot be determined by laymen.
Kelly v. Borwegen, 95 N.J.Super. 240,
243-44 (App. Div. 1967); Mema v. Diamond Jim's., Inc., 145 N.J.Super. 40, 46
(App. Div. 1976). Plaintiff's claims of
emotional distress, including depression, sleep loss, embarrassment and
humiliation are encompassed by this
category; therefore, expert testimony
is required to support them. Dondero's
submissions in opposition to the instant motion were unaccompanied by
any such testimony. Additionally,
symptoms similar to Dondero's were
found to be insufficient to support an
emotional-distress claim in Buckley,
111 N.J. at 368. Accordingly, this claim
also must fail.
Defendants seek the dismissal of
Count 11, the CEPA count, solely on
the ground that it is untimely because
it was not filed within the statute of
limitations period. The whistleblower
statute provides:
Upon g violation of any of the provisions of
this act. an aggrieved employee or former
employee may institute a civil action in a
court of competent jurisdiction, within one
year, for relief . . .
N.J.S.A. 34:19-5.

[3] Defendants argue that the stafcute of limitations began to run on
March 18, 1988, the date they notified
Dondero of his reassignment The
CEPA count of plaintiff's complaint
charges that "a determinative factor
in defendants' decision to discharge
plaintiff was plaintiff's objecting and
refusing to engage in () wrongful and
unlawful acts." (Complaint, Count 11,
H) This language indicates that
plaintiff bases his unlawful-retaliation claim on a theory of constructive
discharge, (id), which began with
plaintiff s reassignment and culmi-
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nated with defendants' refusal to accept Dondero's withdrawal of resignation. The date on which it became
clear that Dondero's and defendants'
regular employment relationship
would terminate was June 23, 1988,
the date on which Carol Asselta, Dondero's replacement as Director of Human Resources, informed plaintiff
that his attempt to withdraw his resignation had been rejected. (Defendants'
Exhibit G). Therefore, the time within
which plaintiff had to file a claim for
retaliatory constructive discharge began to run on this date. Dondero's
June 14, 1989, filing of his complaint
in state court fell within the one-year
statute of limitations period. Accordingly, plaintiff's CEPA claim is timely
and will not be dismissed.
For the foregoing reasons, defendants' motion is granted in part and
denied in part: the motion for summary judgment on Count 1 is granted,
and the motion for summary Judgment on Count 11 is dismissed. An order accompanies this opinion. No
costs.
Order
This matter having come before the
court on motion by defendants, Lenox
China, Richard L. Lewis and Anthony
L. Barth, for summary judgment on
Counts 8 and 11 of the complaint herein; and the court having considered
the written submission and oral argument of counsel; and good cause appearing,
IT IS on this 19th day of June, 1990,
ORDERED that defendant's motion
be granted with respect to Count 8 and
denied with respect to Count 11; and it
is further
ORDERED that Count 8 of the complaint filed herein be and hereby is
dismissed.

LOFVENDAHL T. BARCLAYS
AMERICAN CORP.
VS. District Court,
Central District of California
LOFVENDAHL v. BARCLAYS
AMERICAN CORPORATION, et al.,
No. CV 89-3228-RSWL, April 17, 1990
CONTRACTS
1. Discharge — Breach — National
Banking Act H00.07 M50.1205
Bank that submitted no evidence
that officer was discharged by board of
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directors may not rely on at-pleasure
provision of National Banking Act in
defense of breach-of-contract claim.
2. Discharge — Breach — Disclaimer — Summary judgment •450.1205
•450.09 *515.15
In light of clear at-will disclaimers
in application form and employee
handbook, discharged employee's evidence that supervisor offered him
long-term employment when he was
hired constitutes mere ''scintilla of
evidence" of implied or express forcause contract, which is insufficient to
avoid summary Judgment for employer.
3. Discharge — Reduction in force —
Summary Judgment »450.1205
•200.1565 >515.15
Employee whose position was eliminated during reduction in force was
discharged for cause and has no claim
for breach of contract; evidence shows
that bank had stopped servicing most
of its customers, and fact that cutback
was not discussed with his supervisor
and that supervisor was shocked to
learn of it constitutes mere "scintilla
of evidence" that cutback was not for
legitimate business reasons, which is
insufficient to avoid summary judgment for employer.
PUBLIC POLICY
4. Reporting misconduct of co-worker to police •425.0301
Employee fails to state claim for discharge in violation of public policy,
where he was terminated after reporting to police that his supervisor had
struck him during fistfight; weight of
evidence shows that employee was discharged when his position was eliminated during reduction in force.
TORTS
5. Exclusivity of remedies — Intentional infliction of emotional distress
•505.11 ^400.03
Employee's claim that his discharge
caused him emotional distress is
barred by exclusivity provision of
worker's compensation act, since termination is part of normal business
relationship.
DAMAGES
6. Punitive damages — Discharge
•610.0307
Employee whose position was eliminated during reduction in force failed
to show that employer acted with oppression or malice in discharging him,

and punitive-damages claim is not
supported by evidence.

Michael J. Collins (Meserve Mumper
& Hughes), Irvine, Calif., for plaintiff.
Robert L. Lofts and Jan T. Chilton
(Severson & Werson), San Francisco,
Calif., for defendant Barclays.
Christopher W. Gardner (Glynn &
Harvey), Pasadena, Calif., for defendant Brewer.
Full Text of Opinion
LEW, District Judge: — Defendants
Barclays American Corporation and
Barclays Bank of Delaware (hereinafter "Barclays") have moved for summary judgment against plaintiff Steve
Lof vendahl on the first (breach of employment contract) and second (termination in violation of public policy)
claims for relief, that portion of the
third (intentional infliction of emotional distress) claim for relief which
arises from LofvendahTs termination
rather than the alleged assault and
battery, and that portion of the prayer
for punitive damages which is based
on Lofvendahl's termination rather
than the alleged assault and battery.
Lofvendahl timely opposed the motion.
Oral argument was heard on April 16,
1990. Having considered all of the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, and oral argument
of counsel, the Court hereby issues the
following order:
Barclays' motion is GRANTED in its
entirety. Summary judgment is hereby rendered in Barclays' favor against
Lofvendahl on the first and second
claims for relief, that portion of the
third claim for relief which arises from
Lofvendahl's termination rather than
the alleged assault and battery, and
that portion of the prayer for punitive
damages which is based on Lofvendahl's termination rather than the alleged assault and battery.
BACKGROUND
Barclays American Corporation is a
holding company which owns Barclays Bank of Delaware. Barclays
Bank of Delaware's sole business is offering private label credit cards
through retailers. For example, the retailer sells products to consumers on
credit. Rather than extending that
credit itself, the retailer contracts with
Barclays Bank of Delaware to provide
the necessary credit. Barclays Bank of
Delaware makes the decision whether
to extend credit to particular consumers. If the consumer is given credit, he
or she is issued a credit card, bearing
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the retailer's name and logo, which
entitles him or her to secure additional
credit from Barclays Bank of Delaware for goods or services purchased
from the retailer.
Lofvendahl was employed by Barclays Bank of Delaware since 1985 as
vice president and sales manager for
the western region of the United
States, including California. Defendant Raymond Brewer was a senior vice
president for Barclays Bank of Delaware, and Lofvendahl's immediate superior. On April 17, 1989, Brewer and
two other Barclays' executives visited
California for the purpose of checking
on business, and had dinner with Lofvendahl. During and after dinner the
four men each consumed numerous
alcoholic beverages. At about midnight, the two non-party bank executives went to their hotel rooms. Brewer
and Lofvendahl remained and engaged in conversation together. About
2:00 a.m., Lofvendahl and Brewer left
and on the way back to their hotel
rooms they engaged in a brawl/fistfight with each other. Lofvendahl reported the incident to the local police.
Criminal charges were filed against
Brewer but subsequently dropped.
Shortly after the incident, both Lofvendahl and Brewer were terminated
by Barclays. Brewer was terminated
for cause for striking a subordinate.
Lofvendahl's position was allegedly
simply eliminated due to market
forces. Lofvendahl filed this suit alleging four claims for relief for breach of
employment contract, termination in
violation of public policy, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery', respectively. Barclays now moves for summary judgment on the first and second claims for
relief, that portion of the third claim
for relief which arises from the termination rather than the alleged assault
and battery, and that portion of the
punitive damages prayer which arises
from Lofvendahl's termination rather
than the alleged assault and battery*'
FIRST CLAIM FOR REUEF:
BREA CH OF EMPLO YMEST
CONTRACT
The first claim for relief alleges as
follows: Lofvendahl was hired by Barclays on October 16, 1985 as vice president and western area sales manager.
During the course of Lofvendahl's employment, an express and implied-infact employment contract existed between Lofvendahl and Barclays which
provided that Lofvendahl would be
able to continue his employment with
Barclays indefinitely so long as he carried out his duties in a proper and
competent manner, that Lofvendahl
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would not be terminated without good
cause, that Lofvendahl would be given
written notice of and a meaningful opportunity to respond to any complaints lodged against him regarding
his performance, and that Barclays
would not eliminate Lofvendahl's position with the company without proper
notice and explanation. This contract
was evidenced by various wTitten documents, oral representations and
course of conduct. Barclays breached
this contract by terminating Lofvendahl in violation of this agreement.
Barclays argues that it was entitled
to terminate Lofvendahl without
cause and, if not, that Lofvendahl was
terminated for cause.
National Banking Act
The National Banking Act, 12 U.S.C.
§24 (Fifth), provides that a national
banking association has the power to
"elect or appoint directors, and by its
board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other
officers, define their duties, require
bonds of them and fix the penalty
thereof, dismiss such officers or any of
them at pleasure, and appoint others to
fill their places." [Emphasis added.)
This provision has been consistently
interpreted to mean that the board of
directors of a national bank may dismiss an officer without liability for
breach of the agreement to employ,
and that any agreement which attempts to circumvent the complete
discretion of a national bank's board
of directors to terminate an officer at
will is void as against public policy. In
order to be subject to the dismissal
portion of this section, the employee
must have been an officer, and must
have been hired and discharged by the
board of directors (or by persons authorized by the board to do so). Mackey
v. Pioneer National Bank, 867 F.2d 520,
524 (9th Cir. 1989).
[11 In the instant case, Barclays submits a copy of the transcript of Lofvendahl's deposition wherein Lofvendahl testified that he became an
officer of Barclays when he was appointed by the board of directors. However, Barclays submits no evidence
that Lofvendahl was discharged by the
Barclays board of directors. Therefore
summary judgment cannot be granted
on this ground. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Foley and Fugh
California Labor Code §2922 provides in relevant part, "An employment, having no specified term, mav
be terminated at the will of either
party on notice to the other." The
California Supreme Court in Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 47 Cal.3d 654,

5 IER Cases 824

LOFVENDAHL v. BARCLAYS AMERICAN CORP.

254 Cal.Rptr. 211 13 IER Cases 1729] position, wherein the following tran(1988), explained that pursuant to spired,
§2922, If the parties reach no express
Q When you hired fLofvendahlJ. did you
or implied agreement to the contrary, express to him that this was not a tempothe relationship is terminable at any rary position?
time without cause, but when the parA. I don't know if I said those exact words,
ties have enforceable expectations but I'm sure for him to leave his Job he
concerning either the term of employ- would have assumed it wasn't a temporary
J
ment or the grounds or manner of ter- Job.
Q.
Did
you
suggest
to
him
that
this
was
a
mination, §2922 does not diminish the
position?
force of such contractual or legal obli- career
—
yes,
air.
A.
I
would
have
assumed
gations. The presumption that an emQ. Did you assure him that he was going
ployment relationship of indefinite to be with the bank as long as he fulfilled
duration is intended to be terminable the objectives that the bank expected of
at will is subject, like any presump- him?
A. Maybe not in so much in those words
tion, to contrary evidence. This may
take the form of an agreement, express but again, when you were trying to hire
someone
had a present Job, you sold the
or implied, that the employment rela- benefits ofwho
working for the bank.
tionship will continue indefinitely,
Q. And one of those benefits that you were
pending the occurrence of some event selling
was security?
such as the employer's dissatisfaction
A. Yes, sir.
with the employee's services or the ex• ••
istence of some cause for termination.
Q. Under the terms under which you feel
Factors to consider when determining you
were hired, would the bank have the
if an implied-in-fact contract exists right to terminate you in a general eliminaare the personnel policies or practices tion of all sales staff?
A. ... I had to assume giving up a tenof the employer, the employee's longevity of service, actions or communi- year career with G.E. that I would have Job
cations by the employer reflecting as- security, that I would relocate on the preI guess, that as long as I did my job I'd
surances of continued employment, tense,
have a job. ... So, I would have to say that
and the practices of the industry in the
actions
I made were based upon as long
which the employee is engaged. Id. at as I did the job
I would have a job. That was
680, 254 Cal.Rptr. at 225; Pugh v. See's the same kind of scenario I gave to Mr.
Candies, Inc., 116 Cal.App.3d 311, Lofvendahl who had gainful employment &t
324-327, 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 [115 LRRM a very good company ...
Lofvendahl also submits his own dec40021(1981).
Barclays argues that uncontradict- laration wherein he states that he was
ed evidence shows that no express or never led to believe by any of his supeimplied-in-fact contract existed be- riors that his position with Barclays
tween it and Lofvendahl. Barclays was in Jeopardy.
{21 Summary judgment must be rensubmits a copy of the employment application signed by Lofvendahl which dered where the evidence shows that
provides immediately above the signa- there is no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled
ture line,
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
I agree that if I am employed, my employ- to
ment shall not be construed as being for Civ. P. 56(c). There is no issue for trial
any definite period of time, but will be for unless there is sufficient evidence faan indefinite period, terminable at will by voring the nonmoving party for a jury
the Company or me.
to return a verdict for that party. The
Barclays also submit a copy of Bar- mere existence of a scintilla of eviclays* "Employee Handbook/* which dence in support of the plaintiff's posiprovides under the heading "Termina- tion is insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could
tion,"
This handbook does not constitute a con- reasonably find for the plaintiff. Antract of employment between the Company derson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
and you. No commitment for employment 242, 250-252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511-2512,
for any specified duration, e.g. 'lifetime', 01 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The evidence
•permanent' or 'as long as performance is submitted bv Lofvendahl (i.e. Brewer's
satisfactory* shall be valid or binding on the and Lofvendahl's testimony) is merely
Company unless it is expressly set forth in a a scintilla of evidence in Lofvendahl's
written document and signed by the emand is insufficient, in view of the
ployee and the Chief Executive Officer of favor
in the employment applicathe Company. Employment and compensa- language
tion may be terminated with or without tion and the "Employee Handbook" set
cause at any time by the Company or by forth above, to raise a question of fact
as to whether an express or implied-inyou."
contract existed between LofvenLofvendahl testified in his deposition fact
and Barclays whereby Barclays
that he had read the "Employee Hand- dahl
agreed not to discharge Lofvendahl
book."
In response, Lofvendahl submits a without cause. If an express contract
copy of the transcript of Brewer's de- can be found, it provides that Lofven-

LOFVENDAHL v. BARCLAYS AMERICAN CORP.
dahl can be terminated at will without
cause as per the language in the employment application signed by Lofvendahl and the "Employee Handbook " With respect to an implied-infact contract and the relevant factors
set forth in Foley and P%JLQK although
Brewer's deposition testimony indicates that Brewer may have assured
Lofvendahl of continued employment,
the language in the employment application and "Employee Handbook**
clearly shows that Barclays personnel
policy was that employees were terminable at will with or without cause. In
addition, Lofvendahl was employed by
Barclays for a mere three and one-half
years Based on the evidence submitted the Court finds that there is insufficient evidence in Lofvendahl's iavor
to raise a question of fact as to whether an express or implied-ln-fact contract prohibited Barclays from terminating Lofvendahl without cause.
Accordingly summary judgment must
be rendered in Barclays' favor on the
first claim for relief.
Terminated for Cause
Even if Barclays was contractually
prohibited from terminating Lofvendahl at will without cause, summary
judgment must be rendered in Barclays' favor because the Court finds
that Lofvendahl was terminated for
good cause.
Under California law, reduction in
staff to meet market conditions constitutes good cause for termination as a
matter of law Guxnaculas v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc , 761 F.2d 1391, 1395
1119 LRRM 3246) (9th Cir 1985), Clutierham v. Coachmen Industries, Inc,
169 CalApp3d 1223, 1227, 215
CalRptr. 795, 797 [2 IER Cases 1641
(1985) (Where "uncontradicted evidence showed a legitimate business
reason for terminating" an employee,
"|c)ourts must take care not to interfere with the legitimate exercise of
managerial discretion.")
Barclays argues that Lofvendahl
was terminated when his position was
eliminated due to market forces and
the lack of profitability of Barclays
Bank of Delaware's enterprise In support, Barclays submits the declarations of Richard Farmer, president of
Barclays Bank of Delaware and a
member of the board of directors, Dale
Peters, executive vice-president and
chief operating officer of Barclays
American Corporation and a director
of Barclays Bank of Delaware, Charles
Davis, vice president of the human re•ources department of Barclays Bank
of Delaware, and Leonard Casano national field manager for Barclays
fi*nk of Delaware These declarations
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establish the following. At the time
Lofvendahl was terminated, Barclays
Bank of Delaware had been unprofitable for some time In an effort to reverse that trend, the bank drastically
reduced the number of dealers it serviced and placed a moratorium on
signing new dealers Between August
1988 and May 1989, the number of
dealers serviced by the western area
sales region, which Lofvendahl managed, was reduced from 22 to 2. Nationally, by May 31, 1989, Barclays
Bank serviced only 12 dealers, and it
was seriously considering terminating
three of those. The process of terminating dealers continued after Lofvendahl was discharged. Barclays Bank
now services only four dealers nationwide As the number of dealers declined, so did Barclays Bank's need for
sales and marketing personnel to sign
new dealers and service existing ones.
Barclays Bank closed its western area
office in September 1988 and laid off
five of the seven employees under
plaintiff in the region. Staff in the
eastern and central areas was also cut.
The bank felt there was no need to pay
Lofvendahl, or someone else in his position, $70,000 per year to supervise
two sales representatives and, with
their help, service two dealers The employee to whom Lofvendahl's duties
were assigned after his suspension was
able to perform all of those new duties
in about five days a month In or
about February 1989, Farmer and Peters discussed the fact that Lofvendahl
would have to be terminated when the
number of dealers reached a sufficiently low level At the beginning of
April 1989, the bank's sales staff was
headed by a national sales manager.
Brewer, and three area sales managers, Lofvendahl and two others All
four positions have now been eliminate
ed, and the bank no longer employs
sales personnel.
In opposition, Lofvendahl argues
that business necessity and market
forces was just a pretext for Lofvendahl's termination Lofvendahl points
out that Brewer testified in his deposition that he was ••shocked** when he
heard that Lofvendahl's position had
been eliminated because Brewer "was
his direct supervisor, and I ] was on the
senior management team that any decision of that magnitude would have
been discussed at a senior management meeting And it had never been
discussed " Brewer also submits a copy
of a memorandum memorializing a
conversation between Farmer and Davis on April 20, 1989 regarding the
April 17, 1989 incident, wherein the
business necessity for terminating
Lofvendahl was never discussed
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13] As explained above, summary
Judgment must be rendered where the
evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
There is no issue for trial unless there
is sufficient evidence favoring the
nonmoving party for a jury to return a
verdict for that party. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position is insufficient; there must be evidence on
which the Jury could reasonably find
for the plaintiff. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S. 242, 250-252, 106
SCt. 2505, 2511-2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202
(1986). Here, the fact that Brewer was
shocked *hen he learned Lofvendahl's
position had been eliminated, and the
fact that the alleged legitimate business reason for eliminating Lofvendahl's position was not discussed in a
single memorandum memorializing a
single conversation between Farmer
and Davis, is merely a scintilla of evidence that Lofvendahrs position was
not terminated due to legitimate business reasons when considered with the
declaration testimony of four of Barclays' top executives The Court finds
that the evidence submitted would be
insufficient to support a finding by a
reasonable Jury that Lofvendahl was
terminated for a reason other than
business necessity. Accordingly summary Judgment must be rendered in
Barclays' favor.
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
TERMINATION IN VIOLATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY
[4] The second claim for relief alleges
that public policy encourages citizens
to report criminal conduct to proper
state authorities, and that upon Barclays' learning of Lofvendahl's reporting the conduct of Brewer to the police, Barclays terminated Lofvendahl's
employment in order to punish Lofvendahl for that conduct, which termination was violative of public policy.
As stated above, the Court finds that
the evidence submitted would be insufficient to support a finding by a
reasonable Jury that Lofvendahl was
terminated for a reason other than
business necessity. Therefore summary Judgment must be rendered in
Barclays' favor on the second claim for
relief.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF:
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The third claim for relief alleges
that Lofvendahl suffered emotional
distress from the alleged assault and

battery and from his termination.
Barclays moves for summary Judgment on the third claim for relief except that portion that arises from the
alleged assault and battery, arguing
that such claim is within the exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Workers* Compensation Board.
The proper test is whether the acts
alleged were part of the normal employment relationship. When employers step out of their roles as such and
commit acts which do not fall within
the reasonable anticipated conditions
of work, they may not then hide behind the shield of workers* compensation. Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection
District, 43 Cal.3d 148, 233 Cal.Rptr.
308 [1 IER Cases 1644] (1987); Hart v.
National Mortgage & Land Co., 189 CaL
App.3d 1420, 235 Cal.Rptr. 68 (1987),
Semore v. Pool,
Cal.App.3d
,
266 Cal.Rptr. 280 [5 IER Cases 129]
(1990).
[5] As stated above, the Court finds
that the evidence submitted would be
insufficient to support a finding by a
reasonable jury that Lofvendahl was
terminated for a reason other than legitimate business necessity. This act
was clearly part of the normal employment relationship in that Barclays did
not step out of their roles as employers
and commit acts not within the anticipated conditions of work. Thus this
claim is within the exclusive Jurisdiction of the Workers* Compensation
Board.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES PRAYER
[6] Lofvendahl in the operative complaint prays for punitive damages, and
alleges in all four claims for relief that
Barclays acted with malice and op>ression. Barclays moves for summary
udgment on that portion of the punitive damage prayer arising from Lofvendahl's termination rather than the
alleged assault and battery. Again, the
Court finds that the evidence submitted would be insufficient to support a
finding by a reasonable Jury that Lofvendahl was terminated for a reason
other than legitimate business necessity. The Court further finds that there
is no evidence that Barclays acted
with oppression or malice with respect
to Lofvendahl's termination. Summary Judgment must therefore be rendered in Barclays' favor on this issue.
IT IS BO ORDERED.

J
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the performance of plaintiffs Toth and tiffs' claims for breach of an
Branham was inferior to others in the employment contract.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
same areas and their Jobs could more
easily be eliminated without serious
disruption. Affidavit of John E. Menkhaus; (2) plaintiff Threatt had the lowest supervisory performance rating in
the factory, Affidavit of John E. Menkhaus; (3) plaintiff Snyder was selected
because of performance problems,
ALLAN v. SUNBELT COCA-COLA
technical limitations and because he
BOTTLING CO.
was less proficient in certain areas
than another employee in his section,
South Carolina
Affidavit of Charles L. Kuckuck; (4)
Court of Common Pleas
plaintiff Newton's performance was
Dorchester County
substantially inferior to the performance of the three other technicians in
her department, Affidavit of Dwight
ALLAN v. SUNBELT COCA-COLA
D. Morgan; (5) plaintiff Bean could not BOTTLING COMPANY, INC., No. 88get along with other managers and CP-18-936, August 15, 1989
was very defensive when criticized, Affidavit of John E. Menkhaus; (6) plain- CONTRACTS
tiff Hilley's duties had decreased in
recent years because of "changes in
1. Covenant of good faith and fair
manufacturing philosophies" and his dealing *450.I203 »400.13
remaining duties could easily be dividSouth Carolina does not recognize
ed among other employees, Affidavit of
Charles Bauer; (7) plaintiff Gallo "was cause of action for breach of implied
selected for layoff due to his poor job covenant of good faith and fair dealing
performance in comparison with other in at-will employment contracts.
factory supervisors," Affidavit of John
E. Menkhaus; and (8) plaintiff Eames's TORTS
performance was inferior to that of
2. Fraudulent breach of contract
the other four clerks in her department, Affidavit of William H. Rider. •400.05 *275.08
Because the ADEA plaintiffs have not
Warehouse manager who was laid
produced any evidence that these le- off during economic cutback failed to
gitimate reasons for the ADEA plain- state claim for fraud accompanying
tiffs' lay-offs are merely pretextual, alleged breach of contract; there was
the Court concludes summary judg- no evidence of fraudulent intent, or
ment for the defendant is appropriate that reason for layoff was pretextual.
on the causes
of action for violation of
the ADEA.15
CONTRACTS
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
grants the defendant's motion for
3. Handbook — Lack of specificity
summary judgment on the claims for •450.1205
outrage in all of these consolidated
Handbook that recited company's
cases and on the claims for violation of policy
of assisting employees in develthe ADEA in C.A. Nos. 87-1998, oping themselves
opportu87-1999, 87-2000, 87-2002, 87-2004-16, nities and of tryingfortofuture
provide perma87-2005, 87-2006, 87-2007, and nent work under normal
business
87-2515. The Court denies the defen- conditions is not specific enough
to
dant's motion insofar as it seeks sum- alter
employees' at-will status.
mary judgment on any of the plain4. Employer promises •450.1205
Vague oral assurances about job security by company owners were insuf" The Court's conclusion that the defendant has ficient to create contract altering employee's at-will status; subsequent
succeeded in rebutting a pnma facie case of a*e
discrimination is not inconsistent with its earlier handbook containing all employment
holding that the defendant failed to establish as a
matter of la* that the plaintifis did not possess the policies did not include just-cause provision, and oral statements were not
requisite qualifications to enjoy the protection of
the handbook provisions See supra Pan 1(C). The adopted by employer that purchased
fact that the ADEA plaintiffs were less qualified
than others in their departments or that their jobs company.
could more easily be eliminated than others' is a
5. Unilateral modification — Dislegitimate nondiscriminatory reason for laying
claimers •450.1205 ^450.25
them off Those facts, however, do not render them
"unqualified under the handbook provisions
Employer negated any contractual
aruch make no mention of comparative qualifications See supra note 7.
effect of prior employer's handbook
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and oral assurances by issuing conspicuous disclaimers on employment
application and notice of company
policies employer's unilateral modification of just-cause termination policy
to one of at-will does not require employee's express assent, and employee's
return to work constitutes acceptance
of and consideration for change.
€. Reduction in force — Just cause
lor layoff »450.1205 »200.1565 >275.08
Employer did not breach any justcause contract by laying oil warehouse supervisor during reduction In
force, economically motivated cutback
constituted just cause for discharge.

C Steven Moskos, Charleston, 6 C,
for plaintiff
Charles T. Speth n and M Susan
Eglin (Haynsuorth, Baldwin, Johnson
and Greaves), Greenville, S C., for defendant
Full Text of Opinion
BROWN, Presiding Judge — This
matter *as tned before this Court on
July 17-19, 1989 Defendant Sunbelt
Coca-Cola Bottling Company moved
for Directed Verdict after the close of
Plaintiffs case, and again after the
close of all the evidence For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants
Defendant's Motion for Directed Verdict as to all causes of action
FACTS
Plaintiff Michael C Allan was cmplo\ed by Dorchester Coca-Cola Bottling Company (hereinafter "Dorchester") beginning March 26, 1973.
Defendant Sunbelt purchased the
stock of Dorchester on May 31, 1985.
On March 23 1980, Plaintiff was permanently laid off when his position of
Day Warehouse Manager was eliminated as part of an ongoing companywide economic cutback
Plaintiff alleged that his termination breached a contract of employment which allegedly existed between
himself and Defendant based on an
employee handbook and various oral
assurances made by the present and
pnor owners of Dorchester.
The handbook upon which Plaintiff
based his claim was distributed in 1981
by the then-ouners of Dorchester.
Plaintiff relied on the following provisions
It is the operating philosophy of this
Company that each employee be treated
with indiMdual dignity and made a contributing member of the organization The
Company in its obligations to its employ-

ees aets forth the following principles by
which both the Company and the employee
can join in contributing to future job security and individual growth.
•••
6) That to the extent possible the Company
will assist employees in developing them•elves for future opportunities.
6) That employees shall be promoted on the
basis of demonstrated ability and loyalty.
7) That the Company will try insofar ai
possible to provide permanent, steady work
to all employees subject to its normal business conditions
The handbook did not contain specific
procedures as to how layoffs should be
conducted.
In early June, following the purchase of Dorchester by Sunbelt, an
employee meeting was held in the Dorchester warehouse to discuss the sale
with emplovees. Homer Durrous,
Chairman of the Board of Sunbelt,
spoke at this meeting It was undisputed that no guarantees of permanent
employment were made at this meeting Furthermore, nothing was said at
the meeting with regard to the Dorchester handbook or personnel policies.
During his employment by Sunbelt,
Plaintiff received two statements
which notified him that his employment with Sunbelt was at will and
could be terminated at any time The
first such statement appeared on an
employment application completed by
Plaintiff in October 1985 The following statement appears directly above
the signature line.
F U R T H E R , I U N D E R S T A N D AND
A G R E E T H A T MY EMPLOYMENT IS
FOR NO DEFINITE P E R I O D AND MAY.
R E G A R D L E S S O F T H E DATE O F PAYMENT O F MY WAGES AND SALARY BE
T E R M I N A T E D AT ANY T I M E WITHOUT
ANY P R E V I O U S NOTICE.

While Plaintiff denied signing the application, he admitted that he received
The second disclaimer was presented
to Plaintiff on March 8, 1988 This notice contained Company policies describing hours of work, method of payment, vacations, holidays, severance
pay, and sick leave, and Included the
following provision directly above
Plaintiff's signature:
7. These policies are SOT a contract of
employment The provisions of our personnel policies are subject to change at any
time by Sunbelt Coca-Cols Bottling Company Notwithstanding any of the provisions of any personnel policj all employees
of Sunbelt Coca-Cola Bottling Company are
"employees-at-wilT who may quit at any
time for any or no reason and who may be
terminated at any time for any or no reason
(Emphasis In original) Plaintiff admitted that he received the notifica-
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tion, signed it, and understood its
meaning.
The uncontested evidence showed
that Plaintiff and other employees at
Defendant's Summerville and
Charleston facilities were laid off on
March 23 for economic reasons. Defendant presented unrebutted testimony that Plaintiff's former job position remains unfilled to this date and
that the warehouse is operating efficiently despite the job elimination.
Prior to his termination, Company officials attempted to find Plaintiff another position within the Company.
However, no position was available for
which Plaintiff, in the judgment of
management, was qualified.

such a covenant in at-will employment contracts. Satterfield v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., 617 F.Supp. 1359,
1364 (D.SC. 1985). Consequently, no
separate cause of action exists for
breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.
Even if South Carolina were to recognize such a covenant in employment
contracts, there was no breach in the
present case inasmuch as Sunbelt discharged Plaintiff under an express
provision of the handbook. There is no
evidence of anything but that Plaintiff was terminated in an economic
layoff. Within the contract as alleged,
such a termination would not violate
any duty of good faith.

I. Plaintiff Presented No Evidence That
Defendant Violated The South Carolina
Wage Payment Statute.
South Carolina Code Section
41-10-50 provides as follows:
Whenever an employer separates an employee from the payroll for any reason, the
employer shall pay all wages due to the
employee within forty-eight hours of the
time of separation- or the nextregularpayday which may not exceed thirty days after
written notice is given.
"Wages" includes "vacation, holiday,
sick leave, and severance payments
which are due to an employee under
any employer policy or employment
contract." S.C. Code Ann. §41-10-10
(Supp. 1988).
Plaintiff claimed that Defendant
violated the South Carolina wage payment statute by not paying him for 61
days of sick leave which he did not use
prior to his termination. Plaintiff,
however, failed to present any evidence of an employer policy, an employment contract, or a past practice
of paying departing employees for unused sick leave. Plaintiff, in fact, conceded that in certain instances, such
as voluntary quits, employees should
not be paid for unused sick leave. The
absence of proof as to any policy, practice, or agreement to pay employees for
unused sick leave necessitates dismissal of this cause of action.

m . Plaintiff Presented No Evidence Of
Fraud Accompanying The Alleged
Breach Of Contract Sufficient To Sustain This Cause Of Action.
12] The essential elements of Plaintiff's claim for breach of contract accompanied by fraudulent act are: (1) a
breach of contract; (2) fraudulent intent in connection with the breach of
contract; and, (3) a fraudulent act accompanying the breach. Smith v. Ca~
nal Ins. Co., 275 S.C. 256, 269 S.E.2d
348, 350 (1988); Floyd v. Country Squire
Mobile Homes, Inc., 287 S.C. 51, 336
S.E.2d 502, 503-04 (Ct.App 1985). Assuming for the moment that Plaintiff
can establish the first element set out
above, there was a complete failure of
proof as to the other two elements.
Plaintiff made no showing of any
fraudulent act by Defendant at the
time of the termination. Plaintiff presented no evidence that he was discharged for reasons other than the
economic reason articulated by the
Company. Furthermore, there was no
evidence from which the jury could
infer fraudulent intent on the part of
Defendant. No knowing misrepresentation was proved, as required to sustain this cause of action.

IV. The 1981 Dorchester Coca-Cola
Handbook Does Not Constitute A Contract Of Employment Between Plaintiff
And Defendant.
n. South Carolina Does Sot Recognise
In Ludwick v. This Minute of CaroliA Separate Cause of Action For Breach
o/ Implied Covenant of Good Faith And na, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 U
Fair Dealing In The Employment Con- IER Cases 1099] (1985), the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
text.
that the "at-will" doctrine continues
11} South Carolina has recognized to govern employment relationships in
implied covenants of good faith and South Carolina. Without equivocafair dealing in commercial contracts. tion, the Ludwick court stated, "The
See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson doctrine of termination at will reMotors, Inc., 247 S.C. 360, 147 S.E.2d mains the law of this state." 337 S.E.2d
481 (1966); Tharpe v. G.£. Moore Co., at 216. The Court stated further, "Be254 S.C. 196, 174 S.E.2d 397 (1970). No yond (a concern for vexatious and
South Carolina court has recognized frivolous litigationl is a common con-
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cern that the employer not be unduly
fettered in exercising his rightful prerogative to select employees." Id. Ludivick thus affirms the continuation of
the presumption of at-will employment in South Carolina.
In Small v. Springs Industries, Inc.
292 S.C. 481. 357 S.E.2d 452 [2 IER
Cases 266] (1987), the South Carolina
Supreme Court recognized, under a
unilateral contract theory, that an
employer's written policy may constitute a contractual modification of the
at-will relationship if the policy was "a
limiting agreement on the employee's
at-will employment status." 357 S.E.2d
at 455. The holding in Small did not
abrogate the Ludwick presumption.
Employment is at will unless the employer's written policy contains limiting language providing for a different
employment relationship.
(3) In Small the employee handbook
outlined a four-step disciplinary procedure which altered the otherwise atwill employment relationship. Similarly, in Toussaint v. Blue Cross <fc Blue
Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880
1115 LRRM 4708) (1988), upon which
Small is based, the employee handbook
in question contained a specific statement that discharge would be "for just
cause only." Id. at 884. The 1981 Dorchester handbook does not contain the
type of specific procedure or specific
discharge policy addressed in these
two cases. In fact, notliing in the Dorchester handbook sets forth how layoffs or terminations will take place.
Without some limiting language in
the handbook, Defendant's right to
dismiss employees for any reason remains unfettered.
Our holding that this handbook is
not sufficient to establish a contract
finds support from cases in other jurisdictions. For example, in Mursch v.
Van Dorn Co., 851 F.2d 990 [3 IER
Cases 893] (7th Cir. 1988), the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found as a
matter of law that no claim for breach
of contract existed where the handbook's repeated use of nonmandatory
guidelines and permissive wording indicated clear intent not to create a
binding agreement. The handbook in
question repeatedly referred to its provisions as "guidelines," and failed to
contain either "a hierarchy of rules
the infraction of which could lead to
discharge, . . . (and/or a provision] that
a discharge would only be for 'just
cause.'" Id. at 996 (citations omitted).
The court held that an employment
manual can alter an employee's at-will
status only if the handbook contains
express language "clearly manifestling] the parties' intent to bind each
other." Id. at 998.

14] Plaintiff's contract claim was
twofold. In addition to his claim that
the Dorchester handbook constituted
a contract, Plaintiff asserted that certain oral assurances by the prior owners of Dorchester constituted terms of
his employment contract with Sunbelt. However, these oral assurances of
the prior owners are irrelevant, inasmuch as they were never adopted by
Sunbelt Coca-Cola. Furthermore,
Plaintiff himself admitted that the
1981 handbook constituted a complete
compilation of all Dorchester employment policies in operation at the time.
In addition, the oral assurances by
Dorchester's prior and present owners
allegedly relied upon by Plaintiff consist only of general statements about
Job security which are not sufficient to
change the nature of the at-will employment relationship. Aberman v.
Maiden Mills Indus., Inc., 414 N.W.2d
769, 772 [2 IER Cases 1430] (Minn.
Ct.App. 1987). In Aberman, the Minnesota Court of Appeals gave the following examples of oral statements that,
absent stipulation of the duration of
the employment, do not create employment contracts: " 'permanent employment,' 'life employment/ . . . 'as long as
the employee chooses'
'I will always take care of you,' *we are offering
you security,* and lyou will be a] lifetime sales representative.' " Id. at
771-72; Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper
Co., 197 Minn. 291, 294-95, 266 N.W.
872, 874 (1936). Likewise in Mursch, the
Seventh Circuit held that the statement by the company vice president
that "so long as you do your job you
can be here until you're a hundred"
amounted merely to "encouragement
and optimism" and as such did not
create a contract of employment. 851
F.2d at 996. The court noted further
that no reasonable employee would
have taken such a statement to be a
binding contract of guaranteed employment and that such a statement
"should not be twisted and contrived
into an expression of intent to create a
binding contract of lifetime employment." Id. at 998. Like the statements
discussed in Aberman and Mursch, the
oral statements relied upon by Plaintiff in the present case are the type of
"oral, uncorroborated, vague in important details and highly improbable"
statements which are not sufficient to
establish an employment contract.
Aberman, 414 N.W.2d at 771 (quoting
Degen v. Investors Diversified Servs.,
Inc., 260 Minn. 424, 428-29, 110 N.W.2d
863, 866 (1961)).
Even if the Dorchester handbook
and oral assurances were to be viewed
as contractual, Defendant negated
any contractual effect by notifying
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plaintiff that his employment was at conspicuous, unambiguous disclaimnil. The Supreme Court of South ers acknowledged by Plaintiff would
Carolina in Small expressly empha- be to ignore completely the South
sized that an employer retains the Carolina Supreme Court's admonition
freedom to preserve the at-will rela- in Small Accordingly, this Court finds
that no implied contract of employtionship. The court stated:
U an employer wishes to issue policies, ment existed between Plaintiff and
manuals, or bulletins as purely advisory Defendant.
fut*ments with no intent of being bound
fcv them and with a desire to continue un- Finally, even if the Dorchester
der the employment at will policy, he cer- handbook did create an implied conuirJv is free to do so. This could be accom- tract, Defendant 6unbelt did not
phshed merely by inserting a conspicuous breach that contract in discharging
disclaimer or provision into the written doc- Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant Sunbelt
ument.
clearly discharged Plaintiff in accord357 S.E.2d at 455. Thus where an em- ance with the plan and unambiguous
plover has affirmatively expressed its terms of a specific provision included
desire to preserve the at-will relation- in the handbook. The Dorchester
ship with its employees, an employ- handbook provides in its list of general
ment policy cannot provide the basis principles as follows:
for a contrary contract claim, unilafc7. That the Company will try insofar as
era) or otherwise.
to provide permanent, steady work
In the present case, Defendant Sun- possible
to all employees subject to its normal busibelt effectively preserved the at-will ness
conditions.
nature of Plaintiff's employment bracing exactly as the state Supreme Defendant presented uncontested eviCourt recommended: it issued to
that business conditions were
Plaintiff two conspicuous disclaimers, dence
not "normal" at the time of Plaintiff's
one in 1985. shortly after Defendant discharge.
himself, conceded
bought the Company, and the second that earlierPlaintiff,
and the closing of
in 1988. prior to Plaintiff's termina- production atlayoffs
the facility did not contion. The fact that Plaintiff denied
signing the first disclaimer is irrele- stitute "normal business conditions."
vant; he admitted that he received and
16] Plaintiff argued that the handfilled out the application containing book and oral assurances created an
the disclaimer. His failure to turn in expectation that he could be disthe second disclaimer to Company of- charged only for just cause. However,
ficials is similarly irrelevant. He" ad- it is widely held that an economically
muted that he received the disclaimer, motivated reduction in force constiread it, signed it, and understood what tutes "just cause for dismissal." See
it meant.
Boynton v. TRW, Inc., 858 F.2d 1178,
15) Plaintiff's express assent to this 1179-80 [3 IER Cases 13501 (6th Cir.
modification is not required. In the 1988) (applying Michigan law); Crayunilateral contract framework, which son v. American Airlines, Inc., 803 F.2d
clearly applies to the alleged contract, 1097 [1 IER Cases 849] (10th Cir. 1986)
the employees' returning to work the (applying Oklahoma law); Gianaculas
next day constitutes his acceptance of v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 761 F.2d
End consideration for the employer's 1391, 1395 11 IER Cases 938] (9th Cir.
modification of existing policies. 1985) (interpreting both New York and
Brookshaiv v. South St. Paul Feed, Inc., California law); Parker v. Diamond
381 N.W.2d 33, 36 (Minn. Ct.App. 1986). Crystal Salt Co., 683 F.Supp. 168, 173 13
This holding finds support in a recent IER Cases 398] (W.D. Mich. 1988).
decision of the Michigan Supreme Therefore, even if Plaintiff's discharge
court, which decided Toussaint. In is controlled by a contractual "just
Bcnkey v. Storer Broadcasting Co., No. cause" provision, Defendant did not
78200 [4 IER Cases 673] (Mich. June 6, breach this provision when it dis1989) (LEXIS, States library, Mich. charged Plaintiff for economic reafile), the court held that an employer sons.
may unilaterally change from a discharge-for-cause to an employments
CONCLUSION
at-will policy. Mutual assent to the
modification is not required. The court
In sum, the evidence is not sufficient
reasoned that in cases such as Tousic\rat "where 'contractual rights' have to submit the case to the jury- No conansen outside the operation of normal troverted issue of material fact exists
contract principles, the application of on which reasonable persons could difstrict rules of contractual modifica- fer. For the reasons set forth above,
tion may not be appropriate."
Defendant's Motion for Directed VerTo hold Defendant liable for a dict is hereby granted. Judgment is
breach of contract in the face of two hereby entered in Defendant's favor as
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to all causes of action Each party is to
bear its own costs
IT IS SO ORDERED this the 12 day
of August, 1989.

MILLS v LEATB
state claim that department office
conspired to terminate his emp'oy.
ment, at-will status precludes sui
cause of action.
JURISDICTION

MILLS v. LEATH
U.S. District Court,
District of South Carolina,
Florence Division
MILLS v LEATH, Individually and
as City Manager for the City of Myrtle
Beach, et al, No 4 88-2483-15, November 4, 1988
U.S. CONSTITUTION
1. Due-process hearing —- Property
interest — City police officer — Statute M25.0607 *505.11
City police officer's due-process
claim premised on 42 USC 1983 must
fail where he uorked at-will, since he
had no property interest in continued
employment under South Carolina
statute giving city manager authority
to remove employees "when necessary
for the good cause of the municipality "
2. Due-process hearing — Property
interest — City police officer — Personnel manual •425.0607 •450.1205
City personnel manual providing
that employment was at-will does not
give rise to property interest in continued employment despite policy statement that disciplinary actions would
be fair and not based on discriminatory considerations.
3. Due-process hearing — Liberty
interest «— City police officer — Reasons for discharge •425.0606
City police officer who was discharged for "dereliction of duty," allegedly based on his outspoken disagreement with department policy
requiring that officers write at least
two speeding citations per shift, failed
to state liberty-interest claim under 42
USC 1983, since he produced no evidence that reasons for discharge were
publicly disclosed
4. Conspiracy to discharge — Property interest — City police officer
•425.0607 >200.01
City police officer who alleged that
he was discharged because he disagreed with department policy requiring that officers write at least two
speeding citations per shift failed to

5. Pendent jurisdiction — Stai*.U»
claims »5<X>.05
Federal district court declines to exercise pendent jurisdiction over su>
law claim for wTongful discha,ft
where city has been granted summary
judgment on police officer's remairur*
federal due process claims

See also 4 IER Cases 1462.
John R Clark, Myrtle Beach, S C,
for plaintiff
Vance J Bettis, Columbia, S C for
defendants
Full Text of Opinion
HAMILTON, District Judge - Th-s
case arises out of plaintiff s terminition from employment as a police officer on June 29, 1988 The matter a
presently before the court on defendants* motion to dismiss, Rule 12<b*6i.
Fed R Civ. Proc , or in the alternant
for summary judgment Rule 56 Fed
R Civ Proc. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U S C § 1331
The court has concluded that defendants' motion for summarv. jud&rre".:
should be granted on t*o of the cLajni
and the remaining pendent stale .AI
claim dismissed without prejudice

I. BACKGROUND:
Plaintiff, James Mills, * as an er>
ployee of the Myrtle Beach Police Department from May 1971 until he *u
terminated by police chief Staney
Bird on June 29, 1988 ImmecUaj
prior to his termination, plaintiff tr
leges he was directed to issue two
speeding tickets during each shift regardless of his other duties or ghetto

•Plaintiff initially filed suit In state cour »
Aurust 31 1988 and defendants removed una* »
U S C §1441 on September 23 1988
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